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Despite all methodological efforts made in the last three decades, Western instruction
grounds on traditional principles. Most educational programs follow theories that are
mentalistic, i.e., they separate the mind from the body. At school, learners sit, watch,
listen, and write. The aim of this paper is to present embodied learning as an alternative
to mentalistic education. Similarly, this paper wants to describe embodied learning
from a neuroscientific perspective. After a brief historical overview, I will review studies
highlighting the behavioral effectiveness of embodied instruction in second language
learning, mathematics and spatial thinking. On this base, I will discuss some of the brain
mechanisms driving embodied learning and describe its advantages, clearly pleading in
favor of instructional practice that reunites body and mind.
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SCHOOL PRACTICE AND METHODS: WHY IT IS THE WAY IT IS
School practice has been on the search for methods that should make instruction more effective
for many decades (Reynolds et al., 2014). However, the scholar discussion on effectiveness has
not reached practice in a satisfactory way. This is possibly due to the fact that the discussion is
conducted on a pluralistic level (Scheerens, 2016). Also, the translation from scientific theory into
classroom activities seems to be the major challenge and educators stay on what is called best
practice (Bygate et al., 2013). They do their own teaching, i.e., a mix of what they have learned
at university and what they have experienced during their professional development. This mix is
shaped by restrictions due to time table, to compulsory learning materials like text books, and to
other administrative factors that may differ from school to school type. They all have an impact
on the outcome (Baker, 2014). At the end, despite all efforts, students still learn the way their
parents have done, by reading and listening. This is the case for foreign languages (Stæhr, 2008). In
maths, students learn to solve problems, as in the old days by learning formulas and applying them
(Kilpatrick, 2014). In spatial thinking, i.e., the capacity to understand the relationship between space
and objects in a dynamic way, at the base of technology and engineering, present instruction relies
on capacities that students already have (Mahon and Hickok, 2016). For decades, psychometrics
has been showing correlations between the ability to mentally visualize and manipulate spatial
relationships and has attributed them to genetically determined factors. How to enhance these
abilities on a large scale independently of genetic factors is left to improvisation, however (Uttal
et al., 2012). Considering the proven connection between skilled spatial thinking, success at school
and career choice, students with lower spatial abilities are disadvantaged in academic achievement.
Furthermore, they are also not likely to embrace jobs in technology, considered the base of future
innovation, as defined by the OECD as an economic and strategic goal for the future (OECD, 2012).
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The reason why Western school instruction evolves slowly can
be possibly searched in pedagogy. Pedagogy has deep roots into
philosophy. Descartes (1596–1650) laid the foundations of the
mind-body dichotomy in the Discours de La Méthode (Descartes,
1637). In his work, the French philosopher described on one side
the body as a material “machine” containing organs and following
the laws of nature. On the other side, Descartes described the
mind as non-material and independent of the laws of nature.
The interaction between body and mind would be enabled by the
pineal gland, the “seat of the soul.”
The Cartesian dichotomy mind versus body has been put forth
by philosophers as Locke and Kant, among others (Powell, 1990).
More importantly, the influence of Dualism has continued in the
20th century because its principles have flown into Rationalism.
There, the concept of “mind” is transposed into the concept
of “reason,” i.e., the human capacity of thinking that derives
from intrinsic intellectual structures of deduction (BonJour,
1997; Murphy, 2010). Rationalism claims that the only source
of knowledge is the a priori reason. These thoughts are directly
opposed to Empiricism. Empiricism grounds knowledge on the
experience(s) that we collect with our senses, mediated by the
body, a posteriori however.
Rationalism has strongly influenced cognitive sciences in the
20th century. Fodor et al. (1974) described the mind as a set of
computational operations subdivided in modules that are defined
in terms of their function. Originally, Fodor saw no connection
between a module and the reference world outside. He separated
the mind from the body in the manner of Cartesian philosophy.
Later in his work, Fodor (1983) described the modules, language,
for example, as separated from each other but interconnected
with a central mechanism. Similarly, Pylyshyn (1984) described
language as a phenomenon of the mind belonging to a system
with amodal and symbolic units and deprive of connection
to the reference objects outside. Last but not least, in Noam
Chomsky’s most influential work, language was considered as
an abstract phenomenon of the mind (Chomsky, 1965a,b, 1975).
Again, also in Chomsky’s thought the body did not participate in
cognitive processes.
Despite the fact that Fodor (2006, 2008), Pylyshyn (2007),
Berwick et al. (2013), and Fodor and Pylyshyn (2014) have revised
their positions, their original theories are still well eradicated
in common sense. As such they had and have a great impact
on learning and education. We “still” learn with the mind, the
body contains our vital organs and allows us to move around. In
other words, in our common sense, mind and body still subserve
different functions. Hence, when acquiring knowledge, we sit
quietly and concentrate on our “mental” task(s). In instruction,
moving around while understanding or learning a subject is still
considered as an experiment but not common practice.
EMBODIED COGNITION
With the advent of neuroscience, Rationalism has been greatly
challenged. Theories of embodied cognition suggest that the
mind is not an abstract and isolated entity. Rather the
mind is integrated into the body’s sensorimotor systems
(Barsalou, 1999, 2008). Followingly, cognitive processes are
mediated by “body-based systems” (Alibali and Nathan, 2012),
e.g., perception and action (Dijkstra and Post, 2015). Theories of
embodied cognition hold that thinking of an object or a person
triggers the simulation of the experience collected with the object
or the person (Barsalou, 2008; Glenberg and Gallese, 2012). In
fact, neuroscientific studies have demonstrated that processing of
objects, spatial information, music, faces, flavors, odors, and also
mere thinking of these concepts evokes sensorimotor responses,
i.e., body-related activity in the brain (Pulvermuller, 1999, 2001;
Pulvermüller, 2005). This relies on prior experience connected
to manipulating objects, moving around, eating and smelling
things (Zwaan, 1999). Areas and brain structures involved in the
process wire together to networks of neurons (Hebb, 1949) that
represent and store the information. For an apple that a person
takes in her hand, neurons in visual and haptic areas connect
to networks that represent shape, color and texture of the fruit
(Buccino et al., 2016). Networks on different scales connect to
other networks until the representation of the apple maps all
experiences that the subject has collected related to the fruit.
Thinking of an apple by activating the visual image, i.e., the shape
of the fruit, will trigger other network components including the
motor programs involved in grasping, lifting, peeling, smelling
(González et al., 2006), tasting (Barrós-Loscertales et al., 2012),
and chewing the fruit.
Cognitive neuroscience has validated behavioral evidence
collected in the past. For example, linguistic meaning had been
defined for decades in a syntactic way, i.e., as a relationship
between phrase components. Kaschak and Glenberg and Kaschak
(2002) came up with a novel view: phrase semantics has to do with
the body. They asked subjects to identify a sentence containing a
motion verb (“close the drawer”) as sensible and allowed them to
perform either congruent or incongruent movements related to
the phrase, i.e., an action away or toward the body, respectively.
They found that participants performed better in the semantic
task if the action was congruent. Glenberg and Kaschak proposed
the action-compatibility effect (ACE) in order to explain why
participants took advantage of congruent gestures.
The embodied view of cognition is grounded in sensory
and motor experiences (Engel et al., 2013; Mahon and Hickok,
2016). They create multimodal sensorimotor representations
in the brain (Barsalou, 2008). From a purely mechanistic
view, cognition is thus the result of brain functions in a
highly interconnected “system” of cells. These cells respond to
stimulation, i.e., signals that come from the outside world via
ears, eyes, skin, nose, tongue, and motor acts, hence from organs
of the body. The “mind,” the “reason,” is performed by the
brain, an organ of the body. Hence, the mind is not an abstract
entity any longer.
EMBODIED LANGUAGE
One of the cognitive domains that have been most appealing to
mentalistic theories is possibly language. In the seventies of the
20th century, Chomsky described it as an innate phenomenon
of the mind expressed by symbols. Brain imaging studies in
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the last decades have shed a different light on language. For
example, when participants lay quietly in the functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) scanner, simply reading action words
like kick or pick, activates portions of motor cortices in the
brain, specifically those controlling leg versus hand movements
(Hauk et al., 2004). Similarly, reading odor words like jasmine
or cinnamon elicits activity in olfactory regions of the brain
(González et al., 2006). If words were “symbols,” abstract entities
of the mind with no connection to the body, performing a mental
task would not activate brain regions related to sensorimotor
processes occurred during language acquisition and use.
In fact, if we observe how children acquire language, they
perform a multitude of sensorimotor acts. Children hear and
repeat sequences of sounds (words), i.e., symbols but these
symbols are related to objects they perceive with their senses
or to actions they perform. Children cannot be prevented from
touching, dropping, smelling the objects and putting them in
their mouths (Adams, 2016). Therefore, in the brain’s language, a
word must be represented as a sensorimotor network that mirrors
all experiences collected to the concept (Pulvermuller, 1999).
Strikingly, also abstract concepts have shown to be – at least
to a certain extent – embodied. Borghi and Zarcone (2016)
found that even abstract words evoke activity in the portion
of the motor cortex related to the mouth. This is possibly due
to linguistic-social information linked to the re-enactement of
experience (Meteyard et al., 2012). In a recent paper, Buccino
et al. (2019) explain that abstract words, if compared to concrete
ones, are more difficult to brain image because their neural
representation not only involves multiple biological effectors and
different sensory systems but also brain areas coding for social
context. This is to say that abstract words are also experience
related but they are connected to highly complex experiential
clusters. These clusters are not focally localized in a single region
of the brain and therefore difficult to localize during stimulation.
Besides language (Glenberg and Gallese, 2012), sensorimotor
networks in the brain represent also memory (Glenberg, 1997),
perception (Leman, 2014), feelings (Niedenthal et al., 2009), and
higher cognitive functions (Niedenthal and Barsalou, 2005). In
other words, the mind is embodied in all of its parts to different
degrees (Giummarra and Gibson, 2008; Pulvermüller, 2013). The
problem of the grounding of symbols in the real world (Harnad,
1990) that could not be solved satisfactorily with mentalistic and
symbolic approaches has found explanation in neuroscientific
studies. All this is to say that mind and body are intertwined with
each other and that Cartesian theories of the mind cannot be the
reference for educationalists any longer.
SECOND LANGUAGE LEARNING (L2)
AND THE BODY
A first attempt to integrate the body in learning L2 was made
in the Total Physical Response (TPR) developed by Asher in
the 1960s (Asher, 1969, 1977). In the TPR, the teacher gave
commands in L2. Learners listened, comprehended and executed
the commands. The TPR did not require learners to speak at
an early stage. This was done in order to take off pressure from
language production. Learning L2 through commands was meant
to simulate native language acquisition. In fact, children are
asked by the caregivers to do things in order to interact with the
adults’ world. The TPR did not focus on syntax and used mainly
imperative verbs connected to the vocabulary. Consequently,
verbs that could be put in the imperative form or communicative
acts that do not need the imperative were not taught. Criticisms
addressed the method as suitable for early stages of L2 acquisition
in which vocabulary essentials can be acquired through action.
Despite this, over the decades, the TPR made its way in practice
because effective in supporting word recognition (Asher, 1969,
1977). However, no empirical investigations were conducted on
the impact on memory for L2 words and phrases if learners
perform commands while learning. The arguments in favor of the
method have remained qualitative and descriptive in their nature.
Whereas in the TPR the connection L2 learning and the
body was given via actions performed while listening to the
trainer, other approaches use gestures to learn L2. Note that
action and gesture are both tied to language but that they are
not equal (Cartmill et al., 2012). Actions are movements of the
body with an own goal. For example the action of locomotion
from A to B can be labeled as “to go” or “to run” depending
on the performance speed. Two fingers that mimic legs moving
forwards do not have a locomotion goal per se. They do not
perform an action to move from A to B. Rather, the moving
fingers represent a concept that can be a verb as “to go, walk,
run, stroll” but also a noun “walk, walker,” etc. In this case, the
fingers perform gesture which is referred to thought (Goldin-
Meadow, 2003). Gestures belong to different categories (McNeill,
1992) and have been used for centuries in L2 lessons. In his
book, De Radonvilliers (1807) writes on methods to teach Latin
to French natives. The author suggests the use of representative
gestures to clarify concepts when association between L2 and
first language is not possible and to avoid explanations in the
native language (Larsen-Freeman and Anderson, 2013). In L2-
literature, single or multiple gestures are described as pantomime
(Carels, 1981; Seaver, 1992). They capture some aspects of
concepts either iconically or metaphorically (Gärdenfors, 2017).
Two hands opening an imaginary book can be the iconic gesture
for “book” or for the verb “to read,” but also a gestural metaphor
for an abstract concept as “theory” (Macedonia and Knösche,
2011). Emblems, like “thumb up” to express appreciation, are
called conventional gestures. They are standardized and valid
within a group of speakers. The meaning of an emblem can differ
from culture to culture. For example the OK gesture is made
by connecting the index finger and the thumb into a circle. In
Anglo Saxon societies, this gesture denotes approval. Instead, in
some Southern European countries, it is offensive and in the Arab
world it is used while cursing (Kita, 2009). Finally, deictic gestures
point to places (here, there, etc.) or to objects in the environment.
Hence gestures, help us to communicate, they build with speech
the two sides of the communicative coin, “they mutually interact
to enhance language comprehension” (Kelly et al., 2010).
Interestingly, the explicative function of gestures is not
new. Besides clarifying L2 word semantics, gestures fulfill a
further purpose: they help to memorize vocabulary better than
by only reading it or listening to it. This issue had already
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been described by Asher and Price (1967), for actions in a
qualitative way, however. Quinn-Allen (1995) conducted the
first empirical study on the impact of gestures on memory
for words in L2. In a between-subjects study, she taught
112 English native students French expressions. One third
of the group learned the expressions by reading them and
saw no gestures at any time. The second third of the group
memorized the expressions by reading them and performing
emblematic gestures simultaneously. The third subgroup saw
the gestures only in the test phase. The group that had
learnt with emblematic gestures scored best in word recall.
More interestingly, this group forgot fewer items than the
group that had encoded without gestures. In her doctoral
dissertation, Macedonia (2003) had participants learn thirty
six items of an artificial corpus created for experimental
purposes. Eighteen words were learned by hearing, reading
and repeating the words aloud. For the other 18 words,
representative gestures were first performed by the trainer live
and thereafter imitated by the subjects. Significantly better
results in word recall were obtained at all time points for
those words that had been learned with the representative
gestures. Similarly, in a study with the same learning conditions
Macedonia and Knösche (2011) obtained comparable results.
The authors used videos and audios instead of live performance
and Vimmi, a severely controlled artificial corpus conforming
with Italian phonotactics. Ninety-two items, composed in
abstract sentences were learned audio-visually, half of which
were additionally added metaphorical gestures in order to
represent the words’ semantics. Words enriched by a gesture
were better retained in the short but also in the long term.
Another study by Kelly et al. (2009) on Japanese verbs that
were learned audio-visually and by additionally performing a
congruent or an incongruent iconic gesture yielded similar
results. Better memorization was achieved with words trained
with congruent gestures. Non-matching gestures did not
empower memory. Along this line, further work comparing
the recall of words learned with semantically related and
semantically unrelated gestures showed that only semantically
related gestures support memorization in the short and long term
(Macedonia et al., 2011).
To this regard, three features have proven to be essential
in order to get the memory results. First, gesture must
be semantically related to the words. Second, learners must
perform the gestures themselves. This has been described in
the beginning of enactment research as the self-performed-
task effect (SPT) (Engelkamp et al., 1994) and confirmed
in various studies among which one with a pedagogical
agent with anthropomorphic looks instead of a human
(Macedonia et al., 2014a). In that study, school children
aged of about 13 learned 45 Vimmi words. Fifteen items
were encoded audio-visually, i.e., by reading the word and
listening to an audio-file (AV), 15 were learned audio-
visually and by observing the virtual trainer perform a
semantically related gesture (AVO), and another 15 items
were learned by additionally imitating the gesture performed
by the avatar (AVOG). Compared to the baseline (AV) and
to the AVO condition, the words were better retained if
the gestures had been imitated, i.e., self-performed. Third,
when learning with the body, the training must be massed.
In fact, in studies that show the benefit of enactment on
vocabulary items have trainings of a few hours a day, four
or five days in which participants repeat the gestures actively
(Macedonia and Knösche, 2011; Macedonia et al., 2011;
Mayer et al., 2015, 2017). Other studies conducted with the
same experimental materials and protocols showed reduced
performance (Bergmann and Macedonia, 2013; Macedonia
et al., 2014a) or performance that did not reach significance
in the gestural condition (Macedonia et al., 2019). In those
studies, participants were trained according to short experimental
protocols with a few repetitions that occurred on one single
day. Taken together, these studies indicate that the body
is a powerful tool that helps the mind to acquire (at
least) vocabulary in second language. Having in mind the
considerations above and the research that has taken place
in the last 20 years, it is obvious that words can no longer
be understood as abstract symbols of the mind. Instead,
neuroscientific research has proven that words are experience-
related sensorimotor representations in our brains (Pulvermüller,
2005; Pulvermüller et al., 2005).
Why the body, why gestures support memory in the short
and long term, is an issue that has not received enough
attention yet. In 2001, Engelkamp advanced the hypothesis
that motor actions can improve the storage of words because
motor activity engages mechanisms of procedural memory
in the learning process, additionally to declarative memory.
In a combined behavioral and fMRI-study, Macedonia and
Mueller (2016) let subjects hear and read words that they
had learned previously learned with gestures. This stimulation
was enough to activate multiple memory networks but most
strikingly the motor cortices, the cerebellum, and the basal
ganglia, i.e., structures involved in procedural memory circuits.
In other words, the body not only represents knowledge but
also is a powerful tool to additionally store knowledge. L2
instruction can definitely take advantage of techniques that
involve procedural memory in order to enhance memory
(Ullman and Lovelett, 2018).
MATHEMATICS AND THE BODY
About two decades ago, cognitive science began to investigate
the influence of co-speech gestures in mathematical concepts
systematically, by observing gestures that are spontaneously
produced by teachers. A seminal study by Susan Goldin-
Meadow and co-workers on mathematical equivalence focused
on the effect of spontaneous gestures accompanying speech
in teachers and students (Goldin-Meadows et al., 1999).
Teachers were instructed to provide solving strategies only
orally, and by performing a gesture that was either matching
(reinforced the message), or mismatching (differed from the
verbal message). The gestures were embedded within the lesson.
As it was hypothesized, children uptook significantly more
often the strategy presented by the teacher if it had been
accompanied by a matching gesture than by no gesture at all.
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Conversely, children did not benefit of the gestures conveying
a solving strategy different from speech compared to speech
only. Comprehension of the solving strategies was enhanced
by matching and disrupted by mismatching gestures. Goldin-
Meadows et al. (1999) related this results to a possible “second
representational format” that gesture can provide. In other words,
when speech and gestures are combined and match with each
other, speech and therefore mathematical concepts are more
easily captured because of the manual modality which is added
to communication.
Similarly, Alibali and Nathan (2012) sustained that
mathematical thinking is embodied. Following Mc Neills
classification of gestures (McNeill, 1992), the authors analyzed
the gestures produced by teachers and learners while explaining
mathematical ideas and concepts. Thereafter pointing (deictic)
gestures would ground thoughts in the physical environment,
representational gestures would simulate perception and action,
and metaphoric gestures would manifest conceptual metaphors.
In two experiments by Crollen and Noël (2015), 5 to 9-
year-old children had to accomplish one-target, two-target
counting tasks, and additions. While doing this, participants
had no constraints, interfering hand movements, and interfering
foot movements to deal with. Hand movements disrupted
counting more than foot movements. These results suggest
a connection between our fingers and counting. Considering
that in childhood the acquisition of numerical skills is tightly
connected with finger counting, these results do not surprise.
In an fMRI study, Tschentscher et al. (2012) presented adults
digits from 1 to 9 only visually while they lay quietly
in the scanner. Dependently on the participants’ counting
habits (left- or right-starters), hemodynamic activity in the
contralateral motor cortex was observed when the numbers
were presented. This neuroscientific evidence supports the
view of embodied mathematical knowledge. The connection
between motor activity in the brain and counting with
fingers is connected to Hebbian learning mechanisms. They
apply during learning and connect cognitive mathematical
operations with finger movements performed while counting
(Sato and Lalain, 2008).
Wagner (Cook et al., 2016) conducted a between-subjects
study with 65 children (mean age 9 years) to investigate the
effect of gesture learning on mathematical equation problems
as “3 + 8 + 5 = 3 + 13.” The authors hypothesized that
gestures would facilitate understanding of trained material and
would promote transfer when children had to solve equations.
In the study, an instructional avatar was employed in order
to avoid confounding factors that can be created during live
instruction delivered by a human. The avatar explained six
equations either standing still or by performing additional
gestures that were either representative (reinforcing the content)
or beat gestures. The baseline condition consisted of a no-gesture
condition, i.e., an explanation in which the avatar did not move
at all. After instruction, children were assessed by means of
equal addends equivalence problems with matching addends,
transfer problems, and conceptual questions at the computer.
In all tests, children who had learned from the gesturing avatar
performed better than those children who had learned without
gestures. Considering that this study was conducted with a
computer animation avatar in a highly controlled environment,
it stands to reason that the learning effect must come from
the gestures themselves, as noted by the authors of the study
in the discussion.
Peppler (2017) has recently described how counting is
originated in the real world: We count sheep by observing
them. If our eyes are shut or the sheep are not where
we are, we retrieve a concrete image of the animals in
order to count them. We don’t think of abstract living
beings. Instead, we visualize sheep and not dogs the way
we have experienced them. Furthermore, during counting,
we use the body to support the cognitive task by counting
on our fingers. We explain math basic operations (addition,
subtraction, division, and multiplication) to children by putting
real world things together, taking them apart from each other,
cutting them, and so on. All this, we do by means of
our body. Even alliterate persons who cannot read or write
numbers can perform the operations by referencing the task to
real world objects.
Nathan and Walkington (2017) have developed a theory
of grounded and embodied mathematical cognition (GEMC)
that proposes action and gesture as tools to understand
properties of concepts related to science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM). They investigated
geometric proofs, an area in which conceptual understanding
of abstraction is necessary and mathematical procedures
(among others algorithms). According to Nathan et al.
(2014), proof practice involves notations, speech, gesture,
and enactment of mathematical concepts. In a behavioral study,
120 undergraduate students were asked to generate proofs
by thinking aloud for two mathematical tasks in front of an
interactive whiteboard. Before starting the proof, participants
had performed either grounding (relevant to the task), or
non-grounding (irrelevant) actions. For example, for a task
concerning a triangle, the relevant action was to touch colored
dots on the whiteboard that were symmetrically positioned
in order to embody the key idea of triangle. Non-grounding
actions like tapping on small diamonds on the whiteboard
without any conceptual connection were also randomly
performed. Grounding actions had a beneficial transfer effect
on the experimental task: participants performed better in
generating mathematical insights and could enhance their
performance when additionally using language to describe the
proof (Nathan et al., 2014).
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTRUCTION
There is a similarity in the way how we still consider both
(second) language and mathematics: i.e., as abstract domains
of cognition. Not only that we use the body in order to
learn words and their meaning. We also learn mathematical
concepts with the body and empirical evidence is cumulating
year after year in favor of this view, of embodied mathematics
(Soylu et al., 2018). In other words, the Cartesian era is over:
neither Descartes, nor Kant or Fodor were right. Cognition is
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neither amodal nor symbolic. Empirical evidence shows that
in at least two educational domains, i.e., second language and
mathematics, embodied strategies lay the base for enhanced
understanding and learning. The body - via action and gesture
- is a powerful tool to understand and to learn school subjects.
However, embodiment deprived of its neuroscientific base would
have no chance in educational contexts. We have investigated
the brain in order to know that the human mind does not
work like a “computer” processing symbols. Neuroscience has
unveiled (at least partially) brain patterns behind language
and mathematical thinking and they are grounded in action
and perception, in the body. The idea to pursue is now to
create learning contexts which allow brain based instruction and
embodied learning. These contexts can be natural, in interaction
with a teacher but also they can employ immersive technologies,
in which embodiment is performed in virtual or augmented
reality (mixed reality) (Lindgren and Johnson-Glenberg, 2013;
Macedonia et al., 2014b). Considering that the future of
employment is tied to excellent education, there is an
urgent need to make instructional methods more effective
by combining evidence based behavioral and neuroscientific
research with methodology.
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